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NEWFOUND RELIGION: MOTHERS, GOD, AND
INFANTICIDE
Susan Ayres *
Infanticide dates back to ancient times—in Greek city-states, for
instance, disabled newborns were left outside to die of exposure. 1 Other
ancient cultures—including Muslim, Hindu, and Chinese cultures—
practiced infanticide for varying reasons.2 In the middle ages, infanticide
was common in Western Europe and different methods of killing infants,
such as overlaying a child (suffocation), were considered merely venial or
minor sins. 3 In the seventeenth century, the concern over infanticides of
illegitimate children resulted in the 1624 English concealment law which
provided that single women who concealed their pregnancies were
presumptively guilty of infanticide unless they could prove the child was
born dead. 4 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in England,
infanticide was so common as to be considered an epidemic. 5 In the
United States, infanticide has been criminalized as murder and is not
treated as a separate offense, as opposed to in England, where the
Infanticide Acts of 1922 and 1938 treat infanticide as a lesser charge of
manslaughter. 6
*

Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. B.A. Baylor
University, 1982; M.A., University of Texas at San Antonio, 1985; J.D., Baylor University
School of Law, 1988; Ph.D., Texas Christian University. I am grateful to Rebecca Eaton for
excellent research assistance and to Michelle Oberman, Elizabeth Rapaport and Lisa
McMinn for reading and commenting on an earlier version of this article.
1. CHERYL MEYER & MICHELLE OBERMAN, MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR CHILDREN:
UNDERSTANDING THE ACTS OF MOMS FROM SUSAN SMITH TO THE “PROM MOM” 3 (2001).
2. Id. at 4-6.
3. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 1, at 7-8; see also Kathryn L. Moseley, The History
of Infanticide in Western Society, 1 ISSUES L. & MED. 345, 355-56 (1986).
4. Laura Gowing, Secret Births and Infanticide in England, 156 PAST & PRESENT 87,
90, 114 (1997).
5. George K. Behlmer, Deadly Motherhood: Infanticide and Medical Opinion in MidVictorian England, 34 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 403, 403-06 (1979).
6. Michelle Oberman, A Brief History of Infanticide and the Law, in INFANTICIDE:
PSYCHOSOCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN WHO KILL 3, 9 (Margaret G. Spinelli
ed., 2003) [hereinafter INFANTICIDE]; see also Christine Anne Gardner, Postpartum
Depression Defense: Are Mothers Getting Away with Murder?, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 953,
957 (1990).
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At the current time, news reports of infanticide appear almost daily in
the United States. 7 The actual incidence of infanticide is impossible to
calculate because of reporting difficulties and problems in ascertaining the
causes of death. 8 Some estimate that one infant is killed every day in the
United States; 9 a jury in a recent Texas case was told that five-hundred
women kill their children each year. 10 This essay focuses on recent Texas
cases involving postpartum psychosis and asks whether the mothers or their
criminal trials can be seen as subverting traditional notions about
motherhood and violence. Are there trial strategies that overcome
traditional stereotypes that the infanticidal mother is mad or bad? Are there
trial strategies that provide juries with a more complete story of the
mother’s actions?
Before considering these questions, it is important to distinguish
postpartum blues, depression, and psychosis.
Postpartum blues—
characterized by crying, mood swings, and anxiety—affects up to eighty
percent of women after childbirth and lasts a brief period of hours or
days. 11 Postpartum depression—a more serious illness—affects about
seven to seventeen percent of new mothers and typically lasts several
months. 12 Postpartum depression has the same symptoms as clinical
depression including “loss of interest in usually pleasurable activities, loss
of appetite, sleep disturbance, fatigue . . . excessive guilt, and suicidal
thoughts.” 13
Postpartum psychosis is much more severe and rare than postpartum

7. For instance, in mid-October of 2005, a San Francisco mother heard voices telling
her to throw her three children into the San Francisco Bay. All three children died. San
Francisco Mom Pleads Innocent to Murder, MSNBC, Oct. 21, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9758632/. In June of 2005, a mother pleaded guilty to three
capital murder charges for helping her husband suffocate, stab, and decapitate their three
young children. Lynn Brezosky, Mother Gets Life for Killing Three Children, FT. WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, July 1, 2005, at B4. In January of 2006, a mother abandoned a newborn
in a Dallas hospital toilet. Bill Miller & Melissa Sanchez, Newborn Found in Toilet at
Hospital, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 7, 2006.
8. Mary Overpeck, Epidemiology of Infanticide, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 6, at 19.
9. Id.; see also Gardner, supra note 6, at 958-59 (listing infanticide statistics for the
United States).
10. Glenna Whitley, Insanely Guilty, HOUS. PRESS, Jan. 20, 2005.
11. Sheri L. Bienstock, Mothers Who Kill Their Children and Postpartum Psychosis, 32
SW. U. L. REV. 451, 456 (2003) (citing Velma Dobson & Bruce Sales, The Science of
Infanticide and Mental Illness, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1098, 1104 (2000)); see also
Katherine L. Wisner et al., Postpartum Disorders: Phenomenology, Treatment Approaches,
and Relationship to Infanticide, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 6, at 38-39.
12. Bienstock, supra note 11, at 456-57; see also BROOKE SHIELDS, DOWN CAME THE
RAIN: MY JOURNEY THROUGH POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION (2005).
13. Bienstock, supra note 11, at 456-57.
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depression, affecting 0.2 percent of new mothers. 14 The symptoms include
“hallucinations or delusions, severe depression, and thought disorders.”15
Often, the hallucinations or delusions are commands to kill the child, or
delusions that the child is possessed by the devil or evil spirits.16
Postpartum psychosis is a long-term and progressive illness that waxes and
wanes—in other words, the symptoms disappear and then reappear more
intensely. 17 As experts comment, “[b]ecause moments of complete lucidity
are followed by frightening psychosis . . . . [t]he illness may go
unrecognized and untreated. Out of shame, guilt, or a paranoid delusional
system, the new mother may not share her bizarre thoughts and fears.”18
Moreover, women suffering from mental illness before pregnancy are at
greater risk for postpartum depression or postpartum psychosis. 19 And
women with previous incidents of postpartum psychosis are at greater risk
of recurrence with a subsequent pregnancy. 20 Some researchers believe
that most cases of maternal infanticide involve postpartum psychosis or
depression, although that claim is disputed.21 Of these three postpartum
mental disorders, postpartum psychosis places children at the greatest risk
of death and is considered a psychiatric emergency. 22
Over the past four years in Texas there have been four highly publicized
cases of maternal infanticide involving postpartum psychosis. Andrea
Yates drowned her five children in the bathtub; 23 Deanna Laney used rocks

14. Id. at 457.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 459-60.
17. Id. at 457-59.
18. Cheryl L. Meyer & Margaret G. Spinelli, Medical and Legal Dilemmas of
Postpartum Psychiatric Disorders, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 6 at 169; see also, The Today
Show: Interview: Rusty Yates, Wife Serving Life in Prison for Drowning Her Five Children,
Gives His Perspective on Deanna Laney, the Mother in Texas Who Bludgeoned Her Two
Sons to Death (NBC television broadcast May 13, 2003) (on file with author) (After Laney
was charged, Yates’s husband appeared on The Today Show and commented about how he
had not recognized his wife’s mental illness.); Mom on Trial for Killing Two Sons with
Rocks, MSNBC, Mar. 30, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4625603/ (on file with author)
(Laney’s husband also said he was unaware of his wife’s mental illness).
19. Wisner et al., supra note 11, at 39; see also, Deborah Sichel, Neurohormonal
Aspects of Postpartum Depression and Psychosis, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 6, at 62.
20. See Wisner et al., supra note 11, at 39 (“40-70% of women with established bipolar
disorder will have a recurrent episode”).
21. See ARLENE M. HUYSMAN, A MOTHER’S TEARS 41, 146 (1998) (“we can clearly
surmise that one must be very ill to entertain and rationalize any thought process that
justifies or precipitates violence directed at a child”) (citing research of Dr. Margaret
Spinelli linking infanticide to mental illness and noting Dr. Phillip Resnick’s disagreement
with her findings).
22. Meyer & Spinelli, supra note 18, at 169.
23. Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215, 218. (Tex. App. 2005).
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to crush her children, killing two and severely injuring one; 24 Lisa Diaz
drowned her two children; 25 and Dena Schlosser sawed the arms off her
toddler. 26 Yates, Laney, Diaz, and Schlosser were all tried for capital
murder, although the prosecutors did not seek the death penalty in the
Laney, Diaz, or Schlosser cases. 27 Yates was found guilty, but in January
of 2005, her life sentence was reversed. 28 Laney and Diaz were found not
guilty by reason of insanity. 29 Schlosser’s trial ended in a mistrial after
jurors deliberated four days. 30
This essay focuses on cultural constructions of infanticide and psychosis,
especially cases in which the mother heard delusional commands to kill her
children. Part I examines the background of the Yates, Laney, and Diaz
cases. Part II explores whether these mothers can be seen paradoxically as
feminist subjects of empowerment rather than as victims. This essay
argues that psychotic mothers have been disempowered and silenced, so
their acts cannot be seen as subversive feminist gestures. Part III, however,
argues that the legal trials of Laney and Diaz demonstrate a possible
subversion through trial strategy. These two trials more fully told the
mother’s story than did the Yates trial and more fully educated juries about
postpartum psychosis. These differences made it more difficult for the
juries—even Texas juries 31—to mete out retributive punishment and much

24. Lee Hancock, Mother Acquitted in Deaths: Laney Insane in 2 Sons’ Killings Could
Go to Mental Hospital, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 4, 2004, at 1A.
25. Whitley, supra note 10.
26. Jennifer Emily, Attorney Takes on Tall Task: Lawyer Appointed to Defend Mom in
Baby’s Killing Aims to Change Views on Mental Illness, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 18,
2005, at 1B.
27. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 215; Lee Hancock, Death Penalty Out for Mother: Prosecutors
in Children’s Stoning Cases Allow a Deadline to Pass, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 19,
2003, at 3A; Whitley, supra note 10; Woman Accused of Cutting Off Baby’s Arms to Go on
Trial, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 11, 2005 (AP Alert, on file with author).
28. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 222. Her petition for discretionary review was rejected by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the court of final resort for criminal matters in Texas, on
November 9, 2005, and the Harris County DA’s office said it will either retry her or
negotiate a plea bargain. See Pam Easton, Texas Court Clears Way for New Yates Trial,
ABCNEWS, Nov. 9, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=1298114&CMP=OTCRSSFeeds0312.
29. Hancock, Mother Acquitted in Deaths, supra note 24; Whitley, supra note 10.
30. Julia Glick, Mistrial in Case of Girl’s Severed Arms, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 26,
2006, available at https://www.mworld.com/m/mw.asp?lp=GetStory&id=185741431.
Schlosser’s trial occurred while this essay was in the final editing stages and is not included
in the analysis.
31. See Deborah W. Denno, Who Is Andrea Yates? A Short Story about Insanity, 10
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (2003); id. at 9-10 (discussing the harshness of Texas
juries, especially in death penalty cases). Harris County is “one of the most punitive
[jurisdictions] in the Western world.” Id.
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easier for the juries to react with compassion.32
I. THE TRIALS OF YATES, LANEY, AND DIAZ
A. Background of the Yates case: The Voice of Satan
According to Yates’s chilling confession, she had been married to
“Rusty” Yates for eight years, and together they had five children—from
the ages of seven years to six months.33 On a morning in June of 2001, she
fed her children breakfast, then filled the bathtub with water and drowned
each child. 34 Afterward, she reported the incident to a 911 operator, then
called Rusty at work. She said, “It’s time,” and told him to come home. 35
Yates suffered from postpartum psychosis and perhaps bipolar disease.36
Three years before the murders, at which point she had four sons, she tried
to commit suicide by overdosing on her father’s sedatives. 37 After a short
stay in the hospital, she again tried to commit suicide by slitting her throat
with a steak knife. 38 She was psychotic and said she had “a vision in my
mind—get a knife, get a knife. I had a vision of this person being
Although her psychosis was successfully treated with
stabbed.” 39
injections of the antipsychotic drug Haldol, and although she was warned
that having additional children would increase her risk of psychosis, Yates
did not like taking medications and had plans to have as many children as
possible. 40
After having four sons, Yates again became pregnant and delivered a
daughter, Mary. 41 She suffered another depression three months later when
her father died, and spiraled into a psychotic condition in a matter of

32. See Susan Ayres, “[N]ot a story to pass on”: Constructing Mothers Who Kill, 15
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 39 (2004) (arguing for the necessity of viewing infanticidal
mothers with compassion); see also Michael L. Perlin, “She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”:
Neonaticide, the Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance of “Ordinary Common Sense,” 10
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 31 (2003).
33. Transcript of Andrea Yates’ Police Interview, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 22, 2002, at 34A.
34. Id.
35. Timothy Roche, The Yates Odyssey, TIME, Jan. 28, 2002, at 42, 50.
36. The experts who testified came to differing diagnoses. See infra notes 53–55 and
accompanying text.
37. SUZANNE O’MALLEY, “ARE YOU THERE ALONE?” THE UNSPEAKABLE CRIME OF
ANDREA YATES 34 (2004).
38. Id. at 37.
39. Id. at 38. She had a previous knife vision after the birth of her first son, but did not
tell anyone about this until after the murders. Id. at 81.
40. Id. at 41.
41. See id. at 44.
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weeks. 42 “She picked at spots on her scalp until they bled. . . she held baby
Mary in her arms nonstop, terrified to put her down. She stopped eating,
drinking, and speaking, and was plagued by hallucinations . . . . She slept
only an hour or two at night. She didn’t eat. She didn’t speak.” 43
Again, Yates was hospitalized in a very depressive state and was
experiencing auditory hallucinations.44 She was released ten days later,
and then re-hospitalized. 45 Her doctor was reluctant to treat her with the
Haldol injections and ordered her to taper off the anti-psychotic medicine.46
Within a matter of weeks she sank back into a psychotic state and drowned
her children. 47
When she was interviewed by psychiatrists in jail, Yates told doctors
that she was Satan. 48 She said she had to kill the children in order to save
them because she was a bad mother.49 She thought she was doing the right
thing because by killing her children who were damned by her bad
mothering—she was ensuring their lives in eternity at the expense of her
own damnation. 50 Andrea thought that taking her children’s lives would be
a good thing, because, as she told another psychiatrist, “if the State of
Texas executed [her], they would kill Satan because Satan was within
[her].” 51 While in jail, she continued to have auditory hallucinations of
Satan’s voice “over the intercom system in her cell” as she had in the past
from television cartoons and movies. 52 She was convinced that “Satan is in
me” and that she could prove it by shaving her head to reveal the numbers
666 and “the mark of the beast.” 53
Although the defense witnesses, including the nationally-known Dr.
Phillip Resnick, testified that Yates was severely mentally ill, psychotic,
and did not know that what she was doing was wrong, 54 the state’s expert
witness, Dr. Park Dietz, rebutted the insanity defense. He testified that
“Yates didn’t do things . . . he would have expected a loving mother to do
if she believed she was saving her children from hell. ‘She doesn’t tell

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 51-53.
Id. at 57.
See id. at 1–8.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 77.
Ayres, supra note 32, at 101-02; O’MALLEY, supra note 37, at 157.
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them they’ll be with Jesus or God,’ he said. ‘She doesn’t offer words of
comfort.’” 55 Although experts testified about Yates’s mental state, no
videotapes were made of interviews occurring during the first weeks after
her arrest. 56 The jury deliberated for three-and-a-half hours before
deciding that Yates was guilty of capital murder. 57 After the punishment
phase of trial, the jury deliberated for thirty-five minutes before deciding
that Yates would not be a future threat to society and recommended a life
sentence. 58
Ultimately, the court of appeals reversed Yates’s conviction on the
grounds that Dr. Dietz gave false testimony; he described a Law & Order
episode in which a mother with postpartum depression drowned her
children in a bathtub. 59 Such a show never aired; thus, the appellate court
held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant Yates’s
motion for a mistrial because the testimony “suggest[ed] to the jury that
[Yates] patterned her actions after that Law & Order episode.”60
Significantly, the jury was informed that the testimony was incorrect after
the guilt-innocence phase of trial, but before the punishment stage.61 After
the jury learned the testimony was incorrect, it recommended a life
sentence. In analyzing whether the false testimony affected the jury
verdict, the court of appeals concluded that “there is a reasonable
likelihood that Dr. Dietz’s false testimony could have affected the
judgment of the jury” on the question of guilt, especially since Dr. Dietz
“was the only mental health expert who testified that appellant knew right
from wrong.” 62 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused the petition
for discretionary review of the appellate court’s decision, so Yates will be
retried unless a plea bargain is reached.63
55. Carol Christian, Yates Knew Drownings Were Wrong, Expert Says, HOUS. CHRON.,
Mar. 9, 2002, at 1A. For an in-depth analysis of Dietz’s testimony, see Denno, supra note
31.
56. See Lee Hancock, Driven by a VOICE. . ., DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 18, 2004,
at 1H (“Ms. Yates was not subjected to any videotaped interview until weeks after her
crime.”).
57. Ruth Rendon, Jury’s Decision Fails to Surprise Acquaintances, HOUS. CHRON., Mar.
13, 2002, at A29.
58. O’MALLEY, supra note 37, at 210.
59. Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215, 221-22 (Tex. App. 2005). Ironically, the same day
that the appellate court handed down its decision, Law & Order aired an episode involving a
postpartum psychosis defense by a “wife accused of killing a young mother and stealing her
infant.” Rohan’s Riffs, NEW JERSEY RECORD, Nov. 13, 2005, at E04.
60. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 215, 221-22.
61. Id. at 219-20.
62. Id. at 222.
63. See supra note 28; see also Anne Marie Kilday, Yates Brought to Houston for Her
Retrial, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 7, 2006, at B6 (indicating that there is also a possibility of a
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B. Background of the Laney case: The Voice of God
While Andrea Yates was initially convicted, Deanna Laney was
found not guilty by reason of insanity. 64 She killed two of her three sons
and seriously injured the third on the night before Mother’s Day in 2003, in
the small town of New Chapel Hill, located outside of Tyler, Texas.65
After waking them up in the middle of the night, Laney killed her sons by
hitting them with heavy rocks. She then called 911 and stated, “I just killed
my boys. I did what I was told to do.” 66 The operator asked, “And who
told you to do that?” Laney responded, “God.” 67 Her six and eight-yearold sons were found dead. Her toddler was found with a massive skull
fracture; he survived, but he sustained permanent brain damage and
permanent loss of vision. 68
Like Yates, thirty-eight year old Deanna Laney home-schooled her
children, and like Yates, was considered a model mother. 69 During her
trial, all five experts testified that Laney was legally insane.70 Laney
believed that God was testing her by commanding her to kill her sons.71
After she was arrested, she told psychiatrists that she had delusions that
everyday events were messages from God—for instance, she considered
her baby’s abnormal bowel movements as God’s message “that [Laney]
was not properly ‘digesting’ God’s word.” 72 On another occasion, she
heard God in the kitchen giving her a recipe for a potato casserole.73
Shortly before the murders she saw everyday objects—such as toys her
plea bargain).
64. Laney’s Pastor Focuses on Healing, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 5, 2004, at A12.
65. Id.
66. Good Morning America: Mother Charged with Murdering Sons: Woman Claims
God Told Her to Stone Children (ABC television broadcast Mar. 30, 2004) (on file with
author).
67. Id.
68. A fund has been set up to help with his care: The Aaron Laney Tragedy Fund, Box
1079, Tyler, TX 75710. See Aaron Laney’s Prognosis, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 5,
2004, 4A.
69. Anne Belli Gesalman, Andrea Yates Redux, NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE, May 17,
2003 (on file with author); see also, Lee Hancock, Laney Told of Devil and Wanting to Die,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 9, 2004, at 1A (During her psychiatric examinations, Laney
revealed that she had suffered from mental illness three years before the murders, but this
was not diagnosed or recognized by her friends or family.).
70. Tyler Mother Thought She Was Chosen by God, NBC5.COM, Mar. 30, 2004 (on file
with author).
71. Lee Hancock, Laney Recounts Killings on Tape: She Says She Didn’t Want to Kill
Her Sons, But God Was Testing Her, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 1, 2004, 2d ed., at 5A.
72. Tyler Mother Thought She Was Chosen by God, supra note 71.
73. Lee Hancock, Laney Said Dead Sons Would Return Alive, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Apr. 2, 2004, at 3A.
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sons were playing with—as messages from God regarding how to
accomplish the test she had been given. 74 When her eldest son Joshua
mentioned “that something in his Bible notebook was ‘a test,’” she thought
this meant that “she was resisting God’s test that would make her one of
the two chosen witnesses [along with Andrea Yates] for the ‘end of days’
foretold in the . . . Book of Revelation.” 75
After Laney was arrested, she believed that Satan was present in her jail
cell. 76 This delusion was based on the fact that she smelled sulfur in her
cell. 77 During her first month in jail she did not believe that she was sick,
and she refused to take any medication.78 During this time in jail she came
to believe that her son Joshua would “be ‘raised up’ from the dead on his
ninth birthday, but began wondering if something was wrong with her
when that didn’t happen.” 79
Both the state and defense made videotapes of psychiatric interviews
with Laney. 80 The state argued that she was not insane, but that her actions
showed she “was deceitful, secretive, methodical and aware she was
committing a crime,” 81 because she hid her plans from her husband, hid her
son’s body, and called 911. 82 At the end of Laney’s trial, the jury, which
had viewed hours of videotapes depicting Laney in a psychotic state,
deliberated seven hours before deciding that she was not guilty by reason
of insanity. 83
C. Background of the Diaz case: The Voice of Doom
In September 2004, Lisa Ann Diaz drowned her two daughters and then
attempted suicide by stabbing herself in the neck and chest more than
twenty times. 84 When her husband Angel arrived home from work that
74. Hancock, Laney Recounts Killings on Tape, supra note 71.
75. Id.
76. Hancock, Laney Told of Devil and Wanting to Die, supra note 69.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Hancock, Laney Recounts Killings on Tape, supra note 71.
80. See Hancock, Driven by a VOICE. . ., supra note 56.
81. Lee Hancock, Jurors Are Expected to Get Laney Case Today, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Apr. 3, 2004, 2d ed., at 3A.
82. Hancock, Laney Recounts Killings on Tape, supra note 71; see also, Lee Hancock,
Mother Acquitted in Deaths, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 4, 2004, 2d ed., at 1A (During
closing arguments the prosecutor compared Laney to a terrorist who follows God’s
command, but who cannot be excused from accountability.).
83. Laney’s Pastor Focuses on Healing, supra note 64.
84. Henry Tatum, No Death Penalty: Collin County DA Made Right Choice in the Diaz
Case, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 24, 2004, at 6B; Tim Wyatt, Mother Had History of
Anxiety, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 3, 2004, at 2B.
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evening, he found the girls’ bodies covered with a blanket and called 911.85
Diaz, who was thirty-three, was tried for capital murder; the prosecutors
elected not to seek the death penalty. 86 Six experts testified that Diaz was
suffering from severe psychotic delusions when she killed her daughters.87
The prosecution, however, argued that she was legally sane at the time
because (1) she had told the jailer that she was ashamed, 88 (2) she was
“calm, alert and relatively cooperative” in the emergency room, 89 and (3)
she was simply miserable and “unhappy with her station in life” so she
“killed her daughters out of spite.” 90
Before the drownings, Diaz was concerned that evil spirits were taking
over her house. She heard voices “that she and her daughters were going to
die a slow and painful death.” 91 In 2002 and 2003, Diaz went to doctors
over ninety times complaining that she had various diseases such as worms,
mad cow disease, seizures, and multiple sclerosis. 92 She tried to rid her
house of germs, constantly cleaning and spraying Lysol around the house. 93
She threw away items such as hairbrushes and pillows that could not be
washed and made her children drink concoctions of Chinese herbs.94 She
also used remedies suggested by the Kabbalah to get rid of the evil spirits,
such as red thread bracelets and sage.95
Like Laney, Diaz’s delusions worsened immediately before the murders.
Diaz had become so delusional that she drank her urine. 96 Finally, when
the family dog would not come to her 97 and she saw two crows land on her
lawn, Diaz took it as a sign that she and her daughters must die that day. 98
That afternoon, she picked up the girls from school, told them they needed
a bath, and then Diaz sprinkled sage on each daughter before drowning
her. 99 She then tried to kill herself with a knife.100 After she was in jail,
85. Wyatt, Mother Had History of Anxiety, supra note 84.
86. Tim Wyatt, Prosecutors Call Mother Resentful, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 4,
2004, at 1B.
87. Tim Wyatt, Deliberations to Resume Today, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug 12,
2004, at 1B.
88. Id.
89. Wyatt, Mother Had History of Anxiety, supra note 84.
90. Wyatt, Prosecutors Call Mother Resentful, supra note 86.
91. Whitley, supra note 10.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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Diaz told psychiatrists that she had heard the “voice of doom,” and that she
“felt [she] had to save [her girls]” from suffering and evil spirits. 101 At
trial, the jury watched videotaped excerpts of various psychiatrists
interviewing Diaz, and then deliberated for approximately twelve hours
before finding her not guilty by reason of insanity. 102 Although the state
initially elected to try Diaz for the murder of one child, after the verdict the
state dismissed the case against her for murdering the other child.103
II. SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL OF PSYCHOTIC INFANTICIDAL MOTHERS
Should we view an infanticidal mother, like Yates, Laney, or Diaz as a
subject of empowerment, rather than as a victim of her circumstances? In
recent books, Brenda Morrissey and Patricia Pearson argue that society
depicts female killers as lacking in agency, and that in the case of mentally
ill women, their illness denies them agency because it suggests they are
irrational actors.104 Pearson describes society’s view of female killers as
“passive and rather deranged little robots who imperil themselves on
cue.” 105 Morrissey argues that we should consider violent crimes by
women as empowering because we should emphasize female agency and
reinforce the humanity of women who kill. 106 In other words, because
patriarchy situates women as outside of representation, or as “other,”
women who kill their children are generally viewed as monsters who acted
irrationally, when they should instead be viewed as subversive agents.107
Poststructuralist feminists have argued that women’s hysteria, as well as
their association with death— either as murderers or otherwise—can be a
source of female empowerment. 108 Thus, it is important to ask whether the
subversive potential of the infanticidal mother is similar to (1) hysterics or

100. See Hancock, Driven by a VOICE. . ., supra note 56.
101. Id.
102. Tim Wyatt, Insanity Led Mom to Kill Jury Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 13,
2004, at 1A.
103. Id.
104. See Tracy L. Conn, When Women Kill: Questions of Agency and Subjectivity by
Belinda Morrissey, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 285 (2004) (reviewing BELINDA MORRISEY,
WHEN WOMEN KILL: QUESTIONS OF AGENCY AND SUBJECTIVITY 21, 23, 24 (2003) and
PATRICIA PEARSON, WHEN SHE WAS BAD: VIOLENT WOMEN & THE MYTH OF INNOCENCE 7,
(1997)).
105. PEARSON, supra note 104, at 23.
106. MORRISEY, supra note 104, at 29.
107. PEARSON, supra note 104, at 73, 76 (arguing that we should view infanticide as an
example “of female aggression” and also claiming that “when feminists have pondered
infanticide at all, they have tended to construe it as a masculine conspiracy to make good
women do bad things”).
108. See infra, notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
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(2) the association of women with death. It is all the more important to ask
these questions because, as Morrissey points out, when a mother kills her
children, feminists often ignore her case, perhaps due “to our pscyhological
make-up: early dependence on mother figures makes us especially
vulnerable to the fear that an evil mother in human form can elicit.”109
First, should we view the psychotic mother as subversive in the sense
that feminist writers have valorized the hysteric? French poststructural
feminists have argued that patriarchy has situated women as outside
representation—as the “Dark Continent,” or as “lack.” 110 Consequently,
these writers have considered women’s hysteria as subverting patriarchy.
For example, Hélène Cixous sees the hysteric as a revolutionary in the
sense that she is “the typical woman in all her force” because she “resists
the system” not by directly contesting patriarchy, but she makes her protest
known indirectly through her hysteria. 111
Can we argue that the psychotic mother, like the hysteric, makes her
protest known indirectly—a protest, for instance, to the difficulties of
mothering, to her oppression within the patriarchy, and to her own loss of
self and speech? While some might believe that Yates, Laney, and Diaz
indirectly protested their overwhelming super-mom responsibilities, such
as home-schooling children—and in Yates’s case, being almost always
pregnant or breastfeeding—these mothers do not come across as figures of
empowerment. Although these responsibilities of mothering factored into
their mental state, these psychotic mothers were not empowered, they were
silenced. We can view them as subjects of empowerment only if we
completely ignore the reality of their mental illnesses. 112 Catherine
Clément makes this point in response to Cixous’s argument. Unlike
Cixous, Clément does not see the hysteric as revolutionary because “[s]he
loses all effectiveness . . . because she herself is the place where everything
is turned back against her; she is paralyzed by it, physically or otherwise,
and thus loses her impact.” 113
109. MORRISEY, supra note 104, at 23. Morrissey notes, “Female violence remains
intrinsically shocking, even to many feminist legal theorists.” Id.
110. See LUCE IRIGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH IS NOT ONE 30 (Cornell University Press 1985)
(1977).
111. Helene Cixous & Catherine Clement, Exchange, in THE NEWLY BORN WOMAN 154
(Univ. of Minn. 1993) (1975). Irigaray likewise sees the hysteric as a possible method of
subversion—in other words, she does not see the hysteric as a revolutionary, but wants to
take the hysteric’s response and recast it as a mimesis that allows women’s speech. See
Dianne Chisholm, Irigaray’s Hysteria, in ENGAGING WITH IRIGARAY 263, 268 (Carolyn
Burke et al., eds. 1994).
112. MARTA CAMINERO-SANTANGELO, THE MADWOMAN CAN’T SPEAK: OR, WHY
INSANITY IS NOT SUBVERSIVE 2-4 (Shari Benstock & Celeste Schenck eds., 1998).
113. Cixous & Clement, supra note 111, at 155.
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In addition to discussing the subversive possibility of the hysteric, some
feminist writers also privilege the association between woman and death.114
Can we look at women’s murders as subversive or empowering? Often,
society considers mothers who kill to be either mad or bad—crazy or
evil. 115 Arguably, however, we should consider these murders as
empowering or as examples of supreme sacrifice similar to Julia Kristeva’s
discussion of the Madonna in her role as mater dolorsa. 116 As Maria
Aristodemou has suggested: “The murderous mother is portrayed
alternatively as the ultimate other, the barbaric and uncivilized woman
who, in rejecting motherhood threatens to undermine society’s fundamental
structures, and on the other hand as the ultimate mother, the heroic martyr
whose sacrifice of her most precious possession, points out the failures and
oppressiveness of those structures.” 117
While Morissey and Pearson assert that we should be cautious about
imposing stereotypes that deny women’s agency, psychosis should be
viewed as an exception to their theories. The examples of famous women
murderers that Morrissey presents do not include psychotic infanticidal
mothers or any women who committed murders as a result of delusional
mental illness. And while Pearson addresses infanticide in the context of
postpartum psychosis and bi-polar disease, she does not argue that women
suffering from mental illness should be seen as acting out their
aggression. 118 Rather, Pearson points out that “[i]nfanticide, like any act of
violence, is profoundly idiosyncratic.” 119 A psychotic mother does not kill
her children with purposeful agency, so she should not be considered a
rational agent with full criminal responsibility for her crime.120

114. See infra, notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
115. See Ayres, supra note 32, at 55–61 (discussing the mad/bad dichotomy).
116. Julia Kristeva, Stabat Mater, in THE KRISTEVA READER 160 (Toril Moi ed., 1986);
see also Laura Dawkins, From Madonna to Medea: Maternal Infanticide in African
American Women’s Literature of the Harlem Renaissance, 15 LITERATURE INTERPRETATION
THEORY 223, 226 (2004) (describing the mater dolorosa as “the mother who renounces the
fleshly tie to her son and relinquishes him into the world (and death)”).
117. MARIA ARISTODEMOU, LAW & LITERATURE: JOURNEYS FROM HER TO ETERNITY 222
(2000).
118. See generally PEARSON, supra note 104.
119. Id. at 91. She impliedly suggests that mothers who are not mentally ill and who kill
their children should be held accountable for acting out of their aggression when she
recounts the comments of a trial judge in a case of neonaticide where a young mother’s
claim that the child was born dead was rejected. The trial judge told the mother that
“This . . . was no miscarriage . . . . It was no abortion. It was no baptism. This was purely
and simply an act of selfish and reckless manslaughter.” Id. at 90.
120. See CAMINERO-SANTANGELO, supra note 112, at 181-82 (concluding her booklength study with the claim that feminists do more to improve women’s lives by privileging
sanity and agency than by privileging madness).
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Additionally, her action should not be seen as an example of heroic
sacrifice unless we accept the reality of her delusions—for instance, Yates
thought she must kill her children to save them from eternal damnation.
We are unlikely to consider such killings heroic.
Thus, the idea that a psychotic infanticidal mother is a subversive
woman is very troubling. First, the hysteric does not have actual
subversive potential because mental illness, including hysteria and
psychosis, silences these mothers. 121 Second, it is doubtful that any
feminist would consider infanticide by a psychotic mother to be a liberatory
act of heroism. Despite these problems in viewing acts of infanticide by
psychotic mothers as subversive, the strategies in the recent criminal trials
of Laney and Diaz demonstrate subversive potential, as discussed in the
following section.
III. SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL OF RECENT TRIALS
Often criminal trials of infanticidal mothers are an opportunity for
spectacle that further silences women. Media and legal discourse portray
the mother as a monster. 122 The trial of such women has been described as
the mad “woman’s capitulation to the narrative of others.”123 The mother’s
voice is silenced and society views her not with compassion, but with
antipathy and a desire for revenge. For instance, the prosecutor in the
Laney case stated, “I did what the law requires me to do . . . For the rest of
my life, I’ll remember Aaron, I’ll remember Joshua, I’ll remember Luke.
I’ll never forget what happened to them on that day.” 124 After Laney was
found not guilty by reason of insanity, many people randomly interviewed
in Tyler, Texas, near her home town, thought she deserved the death
penalty. A local restaurant hostess stated that she would have voted for the
death penalty “[f]or those kids. They didn’t have a chance at life. She did.
She was their guidance. She did them wrong.” 125 Likewise, a fifty-twoyear-old man believed, “She should get the chair,” and said the reason she
didn’t was that the jury wasn’t “firm enough.” 126

121. See CAMINERO-SANTANGELO, supra note 112, at 4; see also, Ayres, supra note 32, at
57-58.
122. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 32, at 56-59.
123. CAMINERO-SANTANGELO, supra note 112, at 16.
124. Lee Hancock, Mother Acquitted in Deaths, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 4, 2004,
at 1A.
125. Kyra Phillips & Art Harris, Family Supportive of Laney, CNN.COM , May 13, 2003,
http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0305/13/lol.08.html.
126. Laney’s Pastor Focuses on Healing, supra note 64. Similar reactions were voiced in
the Yates case in support of her conviction. See Ayres, supra note 32, at 108.
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Despite the typical silencing of these mothers during trial—primarily the
failure to convey the circumstances that could cause a mother to kill her
children—and despite the belief that these mothers are monsters who must
be punished, the two most recent Texas infanticide cases involving
psychotic mothers, Laney and Diaz, demonstrate a subversive potential
both in giving mothers a voice and in moving from retribution to
compassion. Unlike most Western societies that mandate lesser sentences
for infanticide, the United States prosecutes infanticidal mothers under
general murder statutes. 127 A psychotic mother who raises the insanity
defense has the burden of proof to convince the jury that she was legally
insane at the time of the murders. The test for insanity in Texas and in a
majority of states is the narrow M’Naghten test, which requires that the
defendant show that she was laboring under such a defect of reason from a
disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of her act, or if
she did know it, not to know it was wrong. 128 As codified in Texas, the
defendant must satisfy only the second prong: that at the time of the
offense, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, she did not know that
what she was doing was wrong. 129 While the insanity defense succeeds in
only a fraction of one percent of all criminal cases, the defense succeeds in
one-half to one-third of all infanticide cases.130
When a mother raises the insanity defense, the prosecutor and jury use a
rational perspective to judge the mother’s actions, even though postpartum
depression is a prominent cognitive impairment.131 An example of this
127. Meyer & Spinelli, supra note 18, at 170.
128. See Denno, supra note 31, at 12 (discussing strict standards of M’Naghten test and
contrasting it with the American Law Institute standard).
129. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 2005). The majority of jurisdictions
adopting the M’Naghten test require only the second prong because it is seen as the
equivalent of the first prong. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.2(b)(3) (4th ed.
2003). The Supreme Court granted writ of certiori in Clark v. Arizona to determine whether
the state’s adoption of only the second prong of the M’Naghten test violates due process.
126 S. Ct. 797 (2005).
130. Perlin, supra note 32, at 13-15. Others claim that half the mothers who raise the
defense of postpartum psychosis are found not guilty by reason of insanity, one-fourth
receive light sentences, and the other fourth receive long sentences. See Meyer & Spinelli,
supra note 18, at 174. In Texas, the insanity defense is raised in less than one percent of all
felony cases, and results in a “not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict in twenty-six percent
of the cases. See Whitley, supra note 10, at 6. The success rate of the defense in
infanticidal cases in Texas is not documented.
131. Meyer & Spinelli, supra note 18, at 176 (“The test of M’Naghten used to determine
culpability is a test of cognitive (ability to know) capacity. By definition, a diagnosis of
postpartum psychosis assumes impaired cognitive abilities. Therefore, the very factor
(namely, cognition) used to determine culpability is pathognomonic for the illness itself.”);
see also Jessie Manchester, Beyond Accommodation: Reconstructing the Insanity Defense to
Provide an Adequate Remedy for Postpartum Psychotic Women, 93 J. CRIM. L. &
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disconnect between a rational perspective and a cognitively impaired
perspective can be seen in a 1986 Texas case involving a father who killed
his young daughter because he thought she was possessed by the devil.132
The state’s expert opined that although the father was psychotic, he knew
his act was wrong because he dumped her body over a fence along the
highway. 133 According to the state, his actions showed he knew it was
illegal to drive around with a dead body. 134 The jury convicted him,
apparently overlooking other possible explanations for his actions, such as
not wanting a dead devil-possessed body in his car.135 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the verdict as it was supported by a “strong
logical basis.” 136 This reasoning demonstrates the problem with testing the
defendant’s sanity from the perspective of a sane and rational juror: a
psychotic person suffers prominent cognitive impairment and is not
thinking rationally.
Another problem with the M’Naghten test is that there will almost
always be some evidence that suggests the defendant knew that his or her
actions were wrong. 137 Whether it is disposing of the body, calling 911, or
confessing in a cold and calm manner, some evidence will exist that
suggests the defendant knew his or her actions were legally wrong. As the
prosecutor in the Laney case argued to the jury, “The fact that somebody is
psychotic does not mean that they’re insane.” 138
Furthermore, judging the delusional mother’s actions from a rational
perspective is a serious problem, especially in cases in which a psychotic
mother hears the voice of God, Satan, or doom, commanding her to kill her
children. She believes that her actions are morally right even if she knows
they are legally wrong. However, the M’Naghten test does not specify legal

CRIMINOLOGY 713, 739 (2003) (criticizing the M’Naghten test as antiquated because it “fails
to account for irrational impulses and delusions that are common characteristics of many
mental illnesses”).
132. Schuessler v. State, 719 S.W.2d 320, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 326-28.
135. Id. at 328-30.
136. Id. at 330. In another case affirming the murder conviction of a severely depressed
mother who shot her two sons, the appellate court listed evidence that a jury might consider
in determining whether a defendant knew her act was wrong: this evidence included her
demeanor before and after the act, attempts to evade police, attempts to conceal evidence,
and expressions of regret or fear of the consequences. Torres v. State, 976 S.W.2d 345,
347-48 (Tex. App. 1998). In this case, the mother’s conviction was affirmed because she
had taken steps to commit the crime including placing a pillow over her son’s chest before
she shot him—possibly to muffle the shot. Id. at 347.
137. See Torres, 976 S.W.2d at 347-48 (listing evidence that may be considered).
138. Hancock, Jurors Are Expected to Get Laney Case Today, supra note 81.
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or moral wrongdoing, and in many jurisdictions, the prosecutor and jury
focus on whether the mother knew what she was doing was legally wrong,
not whether she knew what she was doing was morally wrong. 139 The
psychotic mother does not doubt that, for instance, she is a bad mother or
that her children might be possessed; rather, she is certain about her
delusional beliefs. 140 Her certainty compels her to act—for instance,
although Yates said that she knew her acts were a sin and were illegal, she
believed they were necessary to save her children. Because she kept her
beliefs a secret, the state’s expert, Dr. Dietz, concluded that this showed
she was aware “that it’s wrong, that it’s a bad idea.”141 Furthermore, she
believed that by being punished by the state, she would be saved from
Satan. 142 Despite Yates’s delusional beliefs, including her belief that she
was doing the morally right thing, the jury was not persuaded that she was
insane. Rather, the jury found that Yates was sane and guilty because she
called 911, because she seemed calm when she confessed, because she
covered the children’s bodies with a sheet, and probably also because of
Dr. Dietz’s opinion. 143
Thus, the Yates jury focused not on Yates’s delusion that her acts were
morally necessary to save her children, but rather on her rational acts, to
support the conclusion that she was not insane. Ironically, Yates suffered
more severe mental illness than did Laney or Diaz. 144 In a few
jurisdictions, such as Washington, courts compensate for the failure of the

139. Renata Salecl, The Real of Crime: Psychoanalysis and Infanticide, 24 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2467, 2476 (2003).
140. Id. at 2474, 2478.
141. Denno, supra note 31, at 45 (“Dietz’s story is based on applying a logical analysis to
Andrea’s truly illogical ruminations. There is really no diagnostically acceptable point to
it.”). Denno also notes that mothers suffering from postpartum psychosis rarely tell others
about their thoughts. Id. This secrecy also characterized the Laney case. Laney kept her
plans a secret because she believed she should be like the Virgin Mary, who kept secret her
virgin pregnancy. Hancock, Driven by a VOICE. . ., supra note 56. Interestingly, Dietz did
not similarly rely on Laney’s secrecy to conclude that Laney was sane. Id.
142. Salecl, supra note 139, at 2473; see also Meyer & Spinilli, supra note 18, at 176
(pointing out that Yates’s conviction was based on her mental state after the murders).
143. See Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 218; Ayres, supra note 32, at 102; Denno, supra note 31,
at 5-6, 17 (arguing that Dietz’s testimony greatly influenced the jury verdict); Lisa Teachey,
Jurors Say They Believed Yates Knew Right From Wrong, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 18, 2002, at
1A (one juror said Yates’s confession showed “that [she] was ‘thinking pretty clearly’ and
that she ‘didn’t sound psychotic’” and another juror said her decision to call 911 showed she
knew what she’d done was wrong).
144. See Hancock, Driven by a VOICE. . ., supra note 56. Dr. Dietz commented that
“Yates had a more obvious and arguably worse mental illness than Ms. Laney” and that
although “[m]y personal view is that it would be better if the law would have acquitted both
Yates and Laney . . . . that’s just a personal opinion. It’s for the lawmakers to decide what
the law will be.”. Id.
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M’Naghtenm test to define “wrong” by applying the deific decree
exception. This exception provides that if a defendant can prove that he or
she had an insane delusion that God commanded the criminal act, the
defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity. 145 Texas and the great
majority of jurisdictions do not allow the deific decree exception.
Although the Yates jury disregarded strong evidence of her insanity and
found her guilty, a subversion of the M’Naghten test occurred in the trials
of Laney and Diaz. Both trials shifted from a purely rational analysis of the
insanity test to a more psychologically persuasive and informative analysis.
Just as in the Yates case, in both the Laney and Diaz cases there was
evidence showing that the mother knew her actions were wrong from a
rational perspective. For instance, like Yates, Laney called 911, and Diaz
covered her daughters’ bodies. All three women kept their plans a secret.
However, the juries in the Laney and Diaz cases must have used a broader
psychological analysis to determine whether the mother knew her acts were
wrong, and must not have limited the analysis to whether the mother’s acts
were legally wrong. For instance, a broader analysis would focus on the
mother’s belief that while her actions were legally wrong, she believed they
were morally right in being necessary to save her children. The mother’s
psychotic certainty in the rightness of her acts would prevail. Similarly,
this certainty explains why a mother would call 911 and confess so calmly
and matter-of-factly; she is confessing to what she believed she was
commanded to do.
Thus, the Laney and Diaz cases can be seen as a subversion of the
traditional analysis of the M’Naghten test on the basis of what a rational
person would do. Of course, the different verdicts can also be attributed to
the fact that Yates heard the commands of Satan, whereas Laney heard the
commands of God. 146 Although it should not make a difference in
determining sanity whether a mother hears the voice of God or of Satan
commanding her to kill her children, perhaps it makes a practical difference
to juries because both the mother and general society “know” that the voice
145. See Christopher Hawthorne, “Deific Decree”: The Short, Happy Life of a PseudoDoctrine, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1755, 1755, 1799-1808 (2000). Hawthorne points out that
the deific decree exception applies only to commands by God and argues that this does not
make sense, rather that the exception should apply to all command hallucinations. Id. at
1758, 1808.
146. Hancock, Driven by a VOICE. . ., supra note 56 (pointing out differences between
two cases regarding God/devil); Good Morning America: Deanna Laney Mother Who
Stoned Children Found Not Guilty, (ABC television broadcast Apr. 5, 2004) (on file with
author) (interviewing attorney F.R. “Buck” Files, Jr., who pointed out differences between
two cases). Of course, the difference between Yates and Laney is not that clear cut, because
Laney had olfactory hallucinations that Satan was present both after she was arrested and
four years before the murders. See supra notes 104–121 and accompanying text.
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of God is good and right, and the voice of Satan is bad and wrong. As Dr.
Phillip Resnick commented: “My opinion was in both [the cases of Yates
and Laney] they were legally insane. But Ms. Laney met the classic
standard in that she was doing God’s work, and she did not question that it
was right.” 147 Dr. Park Dietz, who concluded that Yates was legally sane,
commented: “Andrea Yates knew at the time of the killing that God would
judge her actions as bad.” 148 However, even if Yates knew this, she still
had the delusional belief that it was the right thing to do to save her
children from hell.
Another explanation for the different verdicts might be the agreement by
all of the psychiatrists in the Laney and Diaz cases that the mothers were
legally insane, whereas the psychiatrists did not agree on sanity in Yates’s
case. 149 Moreover, the different verdicts could also be explained by the
fact that only Yates’s jury was a death-qualified Harris County jury, and
these juries are known to give harsher sentences and to be less likely to
acquit on the basis of insanity. 150 That is not to say that Harris County
death-qualified juries always convict infanticidal mothers who are mentally
ill. In the case of Evonne Rodriguez, a schizophrenic mother suffering
from hallucinations who killed her daughter, a Harris County jury found
her not guilty by reason of insanity. 151 Although Harris County is known
for its severe sentences, Smith County, where Laney was tried, is also a
harsh county: “Smith County has sent more people to death row in recent
decades than some of the state’s largest urban counties.” 152 Ultimately, it
is impossible to determine what factors will influence a jury in infanticide

147. Hancock, Driven by a VOICE. . ., supra note 56.
148. Id.
149. Id. Denno also argues that the defense case was weakened by the defense’s own
experts, who could not agree on whether she knew her acts were legal or not. Denno, supra
note 31, at 47–49.
150. See NBC News: Today (NBC television broadcast Apr. 5, 2004) (interview of
George Parnham, Yates’s attorney, who commented on death-qualified juries); see also,
Denno, supra note 31, at 47–49.
151. Mother Who Killed Baby with Rosary Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 11, 1998, at 16A. It should also be noted that Rodriguez’s
trial was after the Susan Smith case, which Perlin argues caused juries to reject the insanity
defense nationwide. Perlin, supra note 32, at 20-21. But during the same time as the
Rodriguez trial, another Harris County infanticide case in which the insanity defense was
raised, resulted in a conviction and fifty year sentence. Harris v. State, No. 14-94-01127CR, 1997 WL 445803 (Tex. App. Aug.7, 1997) (not designated for publication); see Ayres,
supra note 32, at 90–91. In another case, Juana Leija, a psychotic mother in Houston who
killed her children, received ten years probation when she pleaded no contest to murder and
attempted murder charges. See Ayres, supra note 32, at 86-88.
152. Lee Hancock, Doctor Backs Insanity Finding: Jury May Still Decide Fate of TylerArea Mom in Stoning of Children, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 17, 2004, at 3A.
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cases, and perhaps Dr. Resnick is right that “at a gut level, a jury either
forgives or doesn’t forgive a woman.” 153
Despite the difficulty in ascertaining what factors influenced the
different verdicts, one important trial strategy—presenting a persuasive and
informative psychological view of the mother’s actions, for instance, by
showing videotapes of the psychiatric interviews made shortly after
arrest—likely influenced the Laney and Diaz juries in their not guilty by
reason of insanity verdicts.
In the Yates case, there were no videotaped interviews recorded shortly
after her arrest and the jury did not observe her in a psychotic state. The
first videotaped interview was made over three weeks after the
drownings.154 The jury saw videotapes made by defense witnesses Dr.
Phillip Resnick and Dr. Lucy Puryear about three and five weeks after the
drownings, and videotapes made by the state’s witness, Dr. Park Dietz,
about four months after the drownings. 155 In contrast, lawyers for Diaz and
Laney told more of the mother’s story—and gave the silenced mother a
voice even though she did not testify—by playing hours and hours of
psychiatric interviews conducted a short time after the murders. This was a
crucial trial strategy because the jury was able to observe a psychotic state.
As Dr. Dietz commented about the Laney case: “Ms. Laney’s lead defense
lawyer arranged for extensive videotaped psychological interviews of Ms.
Laney within 48 hours of her boys’ deaths and that was ‘one of the great
moves’ of the case.” 156 In effect, the Laney and Diaz trials effectively told
a different story than did the Yates trial.
Educating the jury about the delusional reality of the psychotic mother
by showing videotapes of her in a psychotic state has the effect of raising a
jury’s compassion for the mother. The subversion is a narrative one—and
a very powerful one. It gives the mother a voice—even though she does
not testify—and the jury is visually presented with her story and her mental
state. Observing the mother in a state of psychosis—not just hearing
experts describe the psychosis—makes it easier for the jury to reject the
prosecutor’s arguments that a mother was legally sane and must pay for her
acts. 157
153. Hancock, Driven by a VOICE. . ., supra note 56.
154. O’MALLEY, supra note 37, at 2, 11, 80.
155. Id. at 149, 170, 182.
156. Id.
157. Although it is also possible that the jurors in the Laney and Diaz cases were reacting
to national backlash after the Yates verdict, this theory is not borne out by a juror’s
comments that in Laney, the initial split was eight in favor of conviction, and that “[a]mong
their earliest hurdles was getting beyond the fact that in the other trial, Ms. Yates had been
sent to prison for life.” Hancock, Driven by a VOICE. . . , supra note 56. This juror said
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IV. CONCLUSION
How should society and the criminal justice system react to cases of
infanticide in which the mother hears the voice of God or Satan
commanding her to kill her child? While it is unlikely that psychotic
mothers who kill their children should be seen as figures of empowerment
that subvert our stereotypes of women who kill as mad or bad, recent trials
deploy strategic moves that provide these mothers with a fuller voice. In
contrast with the Yates trial, the Laney and Diaz trials can be seen as
subversions resulting in greater justice for the psychotic mother who kills
her children.
Trial strategies that present a psychologically informative and persuasive
view of the mother and of her delusional certainty that her acts were
morally right allow juries to consider her sanity not just by discrete rational
acts, but by a more complex set of factors. Likewise, trial strategies that
include extensive videotaped documentation of the mother’s mental state
provide juries with compelling “behavioral evidence,” so that as Dr. Park
Dietz commented, “the truth can come out.”158 These trial strategies
subvert conventional views of infanticidal mothers as mad or bad and give
them a voice that can be heard with greater compassion and justice.

that the four in favor of finding Ms. Laney not guilty by reason of insanity “were helped by
the unanimity of psychiatric testimony . . . and people were also swayed by Ms. Laney’s
chilling calmness during her call to 911 and her husband’s trial testimony that he still loved
his wife.” Id. Although this juror does not comment on the videotapes, the defense lawyers
viewed the tapes as crucial trial strategy.
158. Id.

